Arizona law heard in wrong Court?

[Majer]

Got this in an E-mail, was wondering what the more Constitution savvy members think

Article III, Sec. 2, clause 2 says: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction."

 

 

 

Wrong Court Ruled on Arizona Law:

In a stunning development that could potentially send the nation into a Constitutional crisis, an astute attorney who is well-versed in Constitutional law states that the ruling against the State of Arizona by Judge Susan Bolton concerning its new immigration law is illegal.

 

The attorney in question submitted her assertion in a special article in the Canada Free Press.  Her argument states in part, "Does anyone read the U.S. Constitution these days? American lawyers don't read it. Federal Judge Susan R. Bolton apparently has never read it.  Same goes for our illustrious Attorney General Eric Holder.


But this lawyer has read it and she is going to show you something in Our Constitution which is as plain as the nose on your face.
"Article III, Sec. 2, clause 2 says: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction."

In other words, the Judge in the Arizona case has Absolutely No Constitutional Jurisdiction over the matter upon which she ruled.  As the Constitution makes abundantly clear, Only the U.S. Supreme Court can issue rulings that involve a State.  This means that neither Judge Bolton nor the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco , to which the case is being  appealed, have any legal standing what so ever to rule on the issue. Thus, U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder filed the federal government's lawsuit against the State of Arizona in a court that has No Authority to Hear the Case.

 

In a related development, another important discovery was made by those who actually read and take the Constitution seriously.  The Constitution specifically allows an individual State to Wage War against a neighboring Country in the Event of An Invasion, should there be a dangerous delay or Inaction on the Part of the Federal Government.
From Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, these words:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, engage in War, unless Actually  Invaded, or in such Imminent Danger as Will Not Admit of Delay."

No one who is actually familiar with the crisis at the southern border can deny that Arizona is Endangered by the Relentless Assault of Lawless Mexican and Other Invaders who ignore our Laws, inundate our schools and medical facilities with unpaid bills, and even Endanger the very Lives of Citizens with Criminal Drug Cartels that engage in kidnapping, murder, human trafficking, and other mayhem, firing weapons directly at U.S. border cities from across the Mexican border.

The Constitution that forms the basis of the Rule of Law in this Country says that Arizona has the Legal Right to protect itself in the case of Inaction or Delay on the Part of the Federal Government, including Waging War in its Self-defense.

This, when coupled with the Clear Constitutional Mandate that only the Supreme Court will hear cases involving the States, should be ample Legal Basis for Attorneys representing Arizona to go after the Federal Government with a vengeance.  Governor Jan Brewer and the stalwart members of the Arizona Legislature have ample Legal reason to stand firm against the Illegal misdeeds of the Federal Government.  And there are established procedures by which Federal Judge Susan R. Bolton can be removed from her position as a result of her Violating her Oath of Office to Uphold and Defend the Constitution of the United States of America .

[Pathfinder]

Awesome!!!!

From Shakespeare's Julius Caesar:

ANTONY:
Blood and destruction shall be so in use
And dreadful objects so familiar
That mothers shall but smile when they behold
Their infants quarter'd with the hands of war;
All pity choked with custom of fell deeds:
And Caesar's spirit, ranging for revenge,
With Ate by his side come hot from hell,
Shall in these confines with a monarch's voice
Cry 'Havoc,' and let slip the dogs of war;
That this foul deed shall smell above the earth
With carrion men, groaning for burial.

[fightingquaker13]

This is a loser. The Court has held that basically Original Jurisdiction is a plenary power that MAY be excercised, but may also be delegated to "such linferior courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish" (Article III, US Constitution).
Here is a pretty well cited article on the issue. I make no claims to the validity, but on firtst reading, they seem to have done their home work. Its from oncle.com.
FQ13


The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Legal Research Home > United States Constitution > The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Clause 2. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
From the beginning, the Supreme Court has assumed that its original jurisdiction flows directly from the Constitution and is therefore self-executing without further action by Congress.1082 In Chisholm v. Georgia,1083 the Court entertained an action of assumpsit against Georgia by a citizen of another State. Congress in § 3 of the Judiciary Act of 17891084 purported to invest the Court with original jurisdiction in suits between a State and citizens of another State, but it did not authorize actions of assumpsit in such cases nor did it prescribe forms of process for the exercise of original jurisdiction. Over the dissent of Justice Iredell, the Court, in opinions by Chief Justice Jay and Justices Blair, Wilson, and Cushing, sustained its jurisdiction and its power to provide forms of process and rules of procedure in the absence of congressional enactments. The backlash of state sovereignty sentiment resulted in the proposal and ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which did not, however, affect the direct flow of original jurisdiction to the Court, although those cases to which States were parties were now limited to States as party plaintiffs, to two or more States disputing, or to United States suits against States.1085

1082 But in § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 80, Congress did so purport to convey the jurisdiction and the statutory conveyance exists today. 28 U.S.C. § 1251. It does not, however, exhaust the listing of the Constitution.

1083 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). In an earlier case, the point of jurisdiction was not raised. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).

1084 1 Stat. 80.

1085 On the Eleventh Amendment, see infra.

By 1861, Chief Justice Taney could confidently enunciate, after review of the precedents, that in all cases where original jusrisdiction is given by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has authority “to exercise it without further act of Congress to regulate its powers or confer jurisdiction, and that the court may regulate and mould the process it uses in such manner as in its judgment will best promote the purposes of justice.”1086

Although Chief Justice Marshall apparently assumed the Court had exclusive jurisdiction of cases within its original jurisdiction,1087 Congress from 1789 on gave the inferior federal courts concurrent jurisdiction in some classes of such cases.1088 Sustained in the early years on circuit,1089 this concurrent jurisdiction was finally approved by the Court itself.1090 The Court has also relied on the first Congress’ interpretation of the meaning of Article III in declining original jurisdiction of an action by a State to enforce a judgment for a precuniary penalty awarded by one of its own courts.1091 Noting that § 13 of the Judiciary Act had referred to “controversies of a civil nature,” Justice Gray declared that it “was passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.”1092

1086 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861).

1087 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 174 (1803).

1088 In § 3 of the 1789 Act. The present division is in 28 U.S.C. § 1251.

1089 United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.Pa. 1793).

1090 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838); Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). Such suits could be brought and maintained in state courts as well, the parties willing. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898); Ohio ex rel. Poporici v. Alger, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).

1091 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).

1092 127 U.S. at 297. See also the dictum in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398-99 (1821); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431-32 (1793).

However, another clause of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not accorded the same presumption by Chief Justice Marshall, who, interpreting it as giving the Court power to issue a writ of mandamus on an original proceeding, declared that as Congress could not restrict the original jurisdiction neither could it enlarge it and pronounced the clause void.1093 While the Chief Justice’s interpretation of the meaning of the clause may be questioned, no one has questioned the constitutional principle thereby proclaimed. Although the rule deprives Congress of power to expand or contract the jurisdiction, it allows a considerable latitude of interpretation to the Court itself. In some cases, as in Missouri v. Holland,1094 the Court has manifested a tendency toward a liberal construction of its original jurisdiction, but the more usual view is that “our original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly.”1095 Original jurisdiction “is limited and manifestly to be sparingly exercised, and should not be expanded by construction.”1096 Exercise of its original jurisdiction is not obligatory on the Court but discretionary, to be determined on a case-by-case basis on grounds of practical necessity.1097 It is to be honored “only in appropriate cases. And the question of what is appropriate concerns of course the seriousness and dignity of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had. We incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suffer.”1098 But where claims are of sufficient “seriousness and dignity,” in which resolution by the judiciary is of substantial concern, the Court will hear them.1099

1093 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803). The Chief Justice declared that “a negative or exclusive sense” had to be given to the affirmative enunciation of the cases to which original jurisdiction extends. Id. at 174. This exclusive interpretation has been since followed. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807); New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284 (1831); Ex parte Barry, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 65 (1844); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 252 (1864); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 98 (1869). In the curious case of Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), the Court was asked to unseat Justice Black on the ground that his appointment violated Article I. § 6, cl.2. Although it rejected petitioner’s application, the Court did not point out that it was being asked to assume original jurisdiction in violation of Marbury v. Madison.

1094 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

1095 Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1968).

1096 California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 261 (1895). Indeed, the use of the word “sparingly” in this context is all but ubiquitous. E.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 450 (1992); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981); United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973).

1097 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983).

1098 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972). In this case, and in Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972), and Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the Court declined to permit adjudication of environmental pollution cases manifestly within its original jurisdiction because the nature of the cases required the resolution of complex, novel, and technical factual questions not suitable for resolution at the Court’s level as a matter of initial decision, but which could be brought in the lower federal courts. Not all such cases, however, were barred. Vermont v. New York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972) (granting leave to file complaint). In other instances, notably involving “political questions,” cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court has simply refused permission for parties to file bills of complaint without hearing them on the issue or producing an opinion. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (constitutionality of United States action in Indochina); Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966) (constitutionality of electoral college under one-man, one-vote rule).

1099 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 (1982). The principles are the same whether the Court’s jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983); California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027 (1981); Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976).

Last modified: November 17, 2005

[twyacht]

Written by a Constitutional Scholar, even in a language FQ can understand.

http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/05/03/immigration-foreign-affairs-and-the-constitution/

Immigration, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution

by Rob Natelson

Is the Immigration Bill Unconstitutional?

Many “progressive” opponents of the Arizona immigration law are arguing that the law is unconstitutional because foreign affairs is exclusively the province of the federal government.

That foreign affairs is exclusively the province of the federal government is commonly asserted. But it is a myth – at least if one respects the Constitution’s text and original understanding.

Before explaining why, I have to say that a claim that the Constitution reserves powers exclusively for one level of government is an unusual argument for “progressives” to make. In general, of course, the most vocal “progressives” could care less about what responsibilities the Constitution assigns to what levels of government.

It’s not just that they favor the federal government invading the sphere that the Constitution reserves to the states. It’s also that they have repeatedly urged state and local governments to invade the supposedly exclusive sphere of the federal government. Remember all those campaigns for state and local governments to adopt nuclear-freeze resolutions, South Africa boycotts, and nuclear-free zones?

Anyway, let’s move beyond the limitless subject of political hypocrisy to describe just how the Constitution does distribute foreign affairs authority.

First, the Constitution gives the federal government supreme authority over foreign policy. Congress and the President can pre-empt an issue by exercising one or more of their enumerated powers. If Congress dislikes a state action in that realm, Congress can pass a law overriding it. Notice it says Congress, Not a POTUS

If, however, Congress has not acted or acted incompletely, the states have certain reserved powers to act on their own. In other words, the Constitution acknowledges concurrent, although subordinate, state authority over foreign affairs – including immigration.

How do we know this? From both the constitutional text and from the record left by those who debated and ratified the Constitution. Here is the evidence:

* Instead of simply stating that states have no foreign affairs powers, the Constitution (Article I, Section 10) only lists a few specific foreign affairs powers denied to the states. For example, a state may not make a treaty or enter into a confederation with a foreign government.

* Under a rule of interpretation widely recognized by the Founders, the Constitution’s listing implies that all foreign affairs powers not denied remain with the states (subject to veto by federal law or treaty).

* In addition to prohibiting the states from exercising a few foreign affairs powers, the Constitution lists a few others subject to congressional pre-approval – such as the power to make non-treaty compacts with foreign governments. If foreign policy power were exclusively in the federal government, the Constitution would not recognize that states had any ability to enter compacts with foreign governments.

* Nowhere does the Constitution include language such as “all state authority over foreign relations is hereby abolished.” On the contrary, at several points the document assumes some state authority over the subject is retained. For example, the Constitution explicitly acknowledges state power to tax foreign goods to fund inspection programs. It elsewhere assumes that if Congress chooses not to adopt a “uniform Rule of Naturalization,” the states may adopt their own laws.

* The historical record confirms what the text suggests. For example, the records of the Constitutional Convention tell us that the delegates considered whether states could impose embargoes on foreign goods, and deliberately decided to leave that power with the states. A committee of the First Federal Congress recognized this power also.

The doubt about the judicial fate of Arizona’s law arises only because of the Supreme Court’s occasional practice of striking down state laws that Congress has decided to leave alone. This occurs primarily in the area of commerce and foreign affairs, and appears to be driven in part by the historically-false claim that federal power in those areas is exclusive.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court also sometimes lets such enactments stand. So what the Court would do with the Arizona law is anybody’s guess.

Rob Natelson is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Montana and a nationally-known expert on the American Founding. After a quarter of a century in academia, he is leaving this year to fight full-time for freedom as a Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute in Golden, Colorado. His constitutional publications can be found at www.umt.edu/law/faculty/natelson.htm. The views expressed here are his own, not to be attributed to any organization or institution.

***

The failure of the Feds to enforce current law, and in essence protect these United States, reserves the rights of self preservation back to the states, via the 10th Amend.

The negligence of the Feds to their duty, is for the SCOTUS to decide, OR a reasonable and rational thinking POTUS that is not BHO..

Defer to the Truman and Eisenhower "Wetback Doctrine" both of different political parties, but they both seemed to have "got it"...

[fightingquaker13]

You are arguing a different point TW. I agree that the states, as subordinate soveriegn powers, have the right to enforce federal law. Eg., Az. is in the right. The point of my post was merely to state that the SC could lawfully allow a lower court to hear the case, not that I agreed with its ruling.
FQ13

[Sponsor]

[twyacht]

From Majer's OP:


In other words, the Judge in the Arizona case has Absolutely No Constitutional Jurisdiction over the matter upon which she ruled.  As the Constitution makes abundantly clear, Only the U.S. Supreme Court can issue rulings that involve a State.  This means that neither Judge Bolton nor the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco , to which the case is being  appealed, have any legal standing what so ever to rule on the issue. Thus, U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder filed the federal government's lawsuit against the State of Arizona in a court that has No Authority to Hear the Case.


Broader point FQ, the BHO/Holder Justice Dept., should have done their homework, as two things are happening. AZ is within its rights to defend its borders due to Federal dereliction, and since the suit these asshats are pursuing involves a "State", it gets fast-tracked to SCOTUS.

Nothing like a bunch of lawyers to really screw things up...

What else did Shakespeare mention about them?

[fightingquaker13]

From Majer's OP:



Broader point FQ, the BHO/Holder Justice Dept., should have done their homework, as two things are happening. AZ is within its rights to defend its borders due to Federal dereliction, and since the suit these asshats are pursuing involves a "State", it gets fast-tracked to SCOTUS.

This is the only point I'm arguing. Precedent (as I understand it and I could be wrong), says that the SCOTUS can lawfully say that that "fast track" is optional. It MAY hear the case argued directly or it MAY delegate to a lower court. Just because it has original jurisdiction, doesn't mean it has to take it, just that an automatic appeal must be granted. Its a fine point, but an important one. The original author's contention that the lower court has no jurisdiction as the SCOTUS MUST hear the case first, and therefore the judge's ruling is invalid would seem to be wrong. An enumerated power prevents others from usurping it, it doesn't prevent others from enforcing it. In fact, this is the whole point of the case. Establishing a uniform policy of immigration and naturalization is an enummerated power of Congress. Arizona is saying that since the executive won't enforce those laws, as it is charged with doing, that Arizona has the right to do so. Its basically the same (or a similar) point. The fact that a power is enummerated doesn't mean others are prohibited from exercising it unless prohibited from doing so by the Constitution, Order, or statute by the body to whom the power was initially granted. This is legalese, but important legalese.
FQ13

[tt11758]

This is the only point I'm arguing. Precedent (as I understand it and I could be wrong), says that the SCOTUS can lawfully say that that "fast track" is optional. It MAY hear the case argued directly or it MAY delegate to a lower court. Just because it has original jurisdiction, doesn't mean it has to take it, just that an automatic appeal must be granted. Its a fine point, but an important one. The original author's contention that the lower court has no jurisdiction as the SCOTUS MUST hear the case first, and therefore the judge's ruling is invalid would seem to be wrong. An enumerated power prevents others from usurping it, it doesn't prevent others from enforcing it. In fact, this is the whole point of the case. Establishing a uniform policy of immigration and naturalization is an enummerated power of Congress. Arizona is saying that since the executive won't enforce those laws, as it is charged with doing, that Arizona has the right to do so. Its basically the same (or a similar) point. The fact that a power is enummerated doesn't mean others are prohibited from exercising it unless prohibited from doing so by the Constitution, Order, or statute by the body to whom the power was initially granted. This is legalese, but important legalese.
FQ13

Herein lies the rub.  The SCOTUS wasn't afforded the opportunity to hear the case, or bounce it to a lower court.  They weren't given the opportunity.  Since the jurisdiction is the perogative of the SCOTUS, and NOT the plaintiff, the case was then heard in the wrong court. 

It would seem that, had the feds only been seeking an injunction to prevent the enactment of the AZ law in the court they used, it might've been proper to do so until such time as the Constitutionality of the law could be adjudicated by the SCOTUS or another court of the SCOTUS' choosing.  But it would appear, at least on the surface, that once again, FQ's President and his mob ignored and circumvented the Constitution to acheive their ultimate goal.  After all, the end justifies the means to these treasonous bastards.

[fightingquaker13]

Herein lies the rub.  The SCOTUS wasn't afforded the opportunity to hear the case, or bounce it to a lower court.  They weren't given the opportunity.  Since the jurisdiction is the perogative of the SCOTUS, and NOT the plaintiff, the case was then heard in the wrong court.  

It would seem that, had the feds only been seeking an injunction to prevent the enactment of the AZ law in the court they used, it might've been proper to do so until such time as the Constitutionality of the law could be adjudicated by the SCOTUS or another court of the SCOTUS' choosing.  But it would appear, at least on the surface, that once again, FQ's President and his mob ignored and circumvented the Constitution to acheive their ultimate goal.  After all, the end justifies the means to these treasonous bastards.

Maybe, and I hope you are right. However, the states are sued by non-residents, and or the feds, or neighboring states virtually every day. This can involve everything from water rights, to employment law, to civil rights violations, to the 2A, to the Endangered Species Act. If SCOTUS heard all of these cases, it would have time for nothing else. I think the point of the article I cited was to say that by long precedent of letting these cases be heard first by lower courts to establish fact, SCOTUS has implicitly granted them initial, though not final, jurisdiction. The judge seems to have the right to make his boneheaded ruling. It will however, wind up before the Court as only a temporary injunction was granted.
FQ13 who would be thrilled to be proven wrong here

Here's the relevant cite from the article I posted above. (op cit. oncle.com)

"Congress from 1789 on gave the inferior federal courts concurrent jurisdiction in some classes of such cases.1088 Sustained in the early years on circuit,1089 this concurrent jurisdiction was finally approved by the Court itself.1090 The Court has also relied on the first Congress’ interpretation of the meaning of Article III in declining original jurisdiction of an action by a State to enforce a judgment for a precuniary penalty awarded by one of its own courts.1091 Noting that § 13 of the Judiciary Act had referred to “controversies of a civil nature,” Justice Gray declared that it “was passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.”1092

[Jrlobo]

Wow. Someone is actually making us read the Constitution and understand it! The more we understand the less we like what is going on with this government of ours. And I thought we were just a bunch of gun nuts. Notice how none of our astute politicians is versed in the Constitution? That's our fault. They are dummies, but we must be dumber to vote them in office. Stop the country, this is my stop!