I was a human factors engineering major at the Air Force Academy. What we dealt with back then as undergrads was trying to eliminate or reduce the
human factor in aircraft crashes. I think you all can see why that would be relevant for the Air Force to have personnel educated in such things. At the time, we just operated under the ASSumption that 50 to 70% of all aircraft crashes were pilot error.
The first thing that popped into my head when I saw an aerial view of the airport was the approach over the ocean. On a calm day, with no white caps, the ocean is a featureless terrain. It gives you no peripheral vision clues of the ground rush. So you can't judge your speed. Ground rush is important because I am sure ya'll have experienced this before, say like driving in a Corvette or some other sports car, and then later driving in a pick up truck. Even though the speedometer reads the same between the vehicles, the Vette just gives the sensation of being faster...or the truck feels so much slower.
What keys into that is that their ILS (glide scope) for that runway approach was down.
The middle one indicates that the plane's glidescope is good:

I am not sure what the height difference is in the cockpits of the 747 and the 777 are. Back when the 747's first came out, they were so tall that the pilots didn't get the same ground rush when taxiing. So pilots were taxiing too fast. I think Boeing retrofited them with some sort of stick shaker or pedal shaker mechanism or maybe some audible warning to tell the pilots they were taxiing too fast.
They say that the pilot of this Asiana flight had like a gazillion hours in the 747. If the height difference is substantial, the pilot could have thought he was going too fast in the 777 and reduced power, erroneously.
Whatever his peripheral vision/ground rush and just plain seat of the pants feeling told him could have been cross checked with the glidescope, if it had been operational.
As far as the media response, if it bleeds, it leads.