http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_19-2009_07_25.shtml#1248194157A Constitutional Right to Self-Defense?
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_07_19-2009_07_25.shtml#1248194157 [1]Senator Coburn's exchange with Judge Sotomayor last week brought up
the question whether there's a constitutional right to self-defense. A
few thoughts, from [2]a post from a year ago:
1. Heller recognized a right to keep and bear arms in self-defense,
which logically presupposes some legal right to self-defense. Why
would the Constitution let you keep an object for a certain purpose,
when all use of the object for that purpose could be outlawed?
2. Heller often talks of a "right to self-defense" in contexts that
suggest it is of constitutional statute, e.g., "That of the nine state
constitutional protections for the right to bear arms enacted
immediately after 1789 at least seven unequivocally protected an
individual citizen's right to self-defense is strong evidence that
that is how the founding generation conceived of the right."
3. I suppose that a right to keep and bear arms in self-defense could
coexist with a regime that allowed people only a right to self-defense
using arms, and that banned unarmed self-defense, or self-defense with
weapons that might not qualify as "arms" for Second Amendment
purposes. But that wouldn't make a lot of sense: Why would you have a
right to defend yourself -- lethally, if necessary -- using the most
lethal weapons, and not using less lethal means? Sometimes the legal
answer to some questions is "because that's the way we've always done
things, even if you think that's illogical," but that answer can't
work here, because tradition is on the side of a right to self-defense
using whatever means come to hand.
4. But can an opinion by Justice Scalia, no fan of unenumerated
rights, be read as recognizing such a right? Well, it does seem to
read that way on its face; and beyond that, Justice Scalia has
signalled an openness both to unenumerated rights when they have been
broadly recognized for hundreds of years, and to this right in
particular. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996)
(four-Justice plurality authored by Justice Scalia) (suggesting that
"the right to have a jury consider self-defense evidence" may be
"fundamental" and supported by the "historical record"; such a right
would make little sense if self-defense could be abolished as a
defense).
5. At least some lower court judges -- including some Reagan and Bush
appointees -- have shown a willingness to recognize a constitutional
right to self-defense, even before the Second Amendment was recognized
an individual right. Compare, e.g., Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047,
1054-56 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., dissenting); id. at 1047 n.**
(Cudahy, Flaum, Ripple, and Rovner, JJ., supporting rehearing en
banc); DeCamp v. N.J. Depât of Corr., 902 A.2d 357, 361â62 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (endorsing Judge Rippleâs position and
concluding that prisoners have self-defense rights, though without
explicitly deciding whether those are federal constitutional rights or
only state law rights); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S.
107 (1982) with Rowe, 17 F.3d at 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a
constitutional right to self-defense generally, though the case
involved only prisoner rights); White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 347 (6th
Cir. 1986) (rejecting a constitutional right to self-defense
generally, though the only issue in the case was whether the defendant
could be required to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, rather than requiring the prosecution to disprove
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
6. Likewise, at least two state courts have expressly read a state
constitutional right to bear arms in self-defense provision as
supporting a right to self-defense, at least with the constitutionally
protected arms (though for the reasons mentioned in item 2, I don't
see how the right would be so limited). See McKellar v. Mason, 159 So.
2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1964); State ex rel. City of Princeton v.
Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 142â44 (W. Va. 1988).
7. If one counts all the states that have a right to bear arms for
individual self-defense in the state constitution together with all
the states that have a right to defend life expressly mentioned in the
state constitution (and many state courts have indeed read such rights
to defend life and property as securing constitutionally protected
rights), one gets 44 of the 50 states -- an important marker of the
breadth of self-defense as a constitutionally secured right, and not
just a common-law right. See generally Volokh, [3]State Constitutional
Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, 11 Tex. Rev. of L. &
Pol. 399 (2007); see also [4]this earlier post and [5]this one.
None of these, standing alone, would be dispositive evidence that the
courts are likely to recognize a constitutional right to self-defense
in the wake of Heller. But put together, it seems to me they point
strongly in that direction.
I should note, though, that this surely doesn't mean a constitutional
right to use deadly force in all circumstances in which one is
defending oneself. Historical limitations on this right -- either
broadly accepted, or at least accepted by a substantial minority of
states -- are likely to be upheld, especially if history and tradition
is a large part of the basis for recognizing the right in the first
place.
Thus, a rule that one can only use deadly force to defend oneself
against threats of death, serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, and
a few other very serious threats would likely be constitutional (even
though many states also allow use of deadly force to defend against
robbery and in some situations burglary). Likewise, the "duty to
retreat," which is to say the principle that deadly force can only be
used in self-defense if it's genuinely necessary, in that no safe
avenue of retreat is available, is likely to be constitutional, too,
because it has long been recognized in at least a substantial minority
of states. There may be other examples as well. My point is that a
federal constitutional right to self-defense likely exists, especially
in the wake of Heller. But it is not unlimited, and is likely to be
strongest precisely where there's a broad and deep common-law and
statutory tradition of recognizing such a right.
References
1.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071501414.html 2.
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1216170382.shtml 3.
http://www.trolp.org/main_pgs/issues/v11n2/Volokh.pdf 4.
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1216248712.shtml 5.
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1216216736.shtml